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CHAPTER 14
Corporate-Market Power and  
Ideological Domination : The Propaganda 




The Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model (henceforth PM) is confirmed 
by a large body of scholarship.1 Already thirty years ago, when Manufactur-
ing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media was initially published 
authors of a range of scholarly studies produced findings in agreement with the 
main predictions of the PM.2 In spite of that, the PM has been marginalized by 
Western scholarship.3 The emergence of the internet and the new digital media 
environment (henceforth NME) have contributed towards further weakening 
the cogency of PM and related approaches. The decentralized structure of the 
NME as well as novel applications such as Web 2.0 allow for multi-dimensional 
flows of information thus potentially rendering gatekeeping models obsolete. 
As a consequence, a new wave of claims about novel and nearly  unprecedented 
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media freedoms has emerged in academia.4 The arguments of the so-called 
internet celebrants, who mirror the postulations of the liberal school of thought 
in media and Communication Studies, have been somewhat mitigated by 
 scholars who have been pointing to the flaws of what constitutes outright tech-
nicism.5
Notwithstanding, contemporary scholarship far too often lacks a structural 
critique of the corporate media system and its continued role as a dominant 
institution that serves state-corporate elite interests. In fact, much contem-
porary scholarship is concerned with applied research based on quantitative 
research designs at the expense of investigating broader societal issues.6 This 
is striking because next to a digital revolution we are currently witnessing an 
era of almost unprecedented inequality, consolidation of power, militarization, 
serial Western wars, secret interventions, and retail-terrorist blowbacks as well 
as nuclear, and climate disasters.7 McChesney, in fact, argues that society needs 
‘engaged communication scholarship from a broad range of traditions and 
employing a diverse set of methodologies to address the issues before us.’8 A 
PM approach, which is underpinned by an epistemology aimed at challenging 
the co-optation of the media by powerful forces in society, should certainly 
factor well in what we conclude to be significant scholarly debates. Robertson 
even suggests the PM would still ‘be of enormous value as a tool for direct criti-
cism of complicit mainstream media by both elite academics and a much wider 
population of citizens.’9
The aim of this two-part-essay is to further consolidate the relevance and 
applicability of the PM in the internet age as well as to point to areas that prom-
ise its fruitful application. More specifically, part one of the essay will highlight 
the continued significance of corporate-market constraints as major news ‘fil-
ters.’ Part two will address the issue of ideology, arguing that ‘humanitarianism’ 
has become a major reference point to justify Western militarism. The conclud-
ing section will outline a set of broad research areas for scholars interested in 
applying PM.
14.2 Corporate-Market Constraints: Still the Engine of Media 
Deception
The technological architecture of the NME enables one-to-many and many-to-
many flows of communication on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The World 
Wide Web, as a major service of the internet, allows for a multitude of applica-
tions that can be utilized in different ways to distribute information. Digitali-
zation has eliminated spectrum scarcity entry barriers so that any individual 
or organization can set up web-applications to distribute information or oth-
erwise communicate with people on local, national and international levels. 
With current technology, textual, audial, or visual information can easily be 
uploaded on a website and instantly be distributed across the globe. Further-
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more, mobile phones and cameras accelerate the rapid exchange of information 
about world events. Hence, during the 1990s and subsequently, a dominant 
school of thought about the internet emerged that highlighted these virtues 
of digital technology.10 Scholars, politicians, journalists, and public experts 
claimed that the internet would lead towards democratization, media freedom 
and empowerment potentially enabling a true Habermasian public sphere.11 
But as McChesney has highlighted, much of the scholarship and commentary 
about the internet had ‘a single, deep, and often fatal flaw that severely compro-
mises the value of their work’ which constituted their ‘ignorance about really 
existing capitalism and an underappreciation of how capitalism dominates 
social life.’12 The so-called internet celebrants have overemphasized the techno-
logical potential of the internet, thereby neglecting to interrogate how digital 
technology had been shaped by economic power.13
McChesney’s critique echoed important postulations that had been evoked 
in earlier epochs when shifts in media technology occurred. In 1973, Mur-
dock and Golding cautioned ‘against the euphoria which often accompanies 
discussion of […] new media technologies.’14 While speaking to developments 
in broadcasting, most notably innovations such as cable, cassette and satellite 
technology, Murdock and Golding pointed to an important fact:
In each of the media there is an increasingly apparent opposition 
between the social potentialities for redifferentiation and the trends 
towards economic concentration. New techniques permitting greater 
control by the consumer, greater fragmentation and localization, and 
cheaper production are quickly being enveloped in the same economic 
structure […].15
Murdock and Golding advanced the political economy perspective of the 
media suggesting that how media technology may evolve is crucially linked to 
wider societal structures and processes. Applying this framework, scholars have 
pointed to the fact that the technological potential of the internet had not been 
realized at the beginning of the twentieth century.16 In agreement with the pos-
tulation by Murdock and Golding, scholars have highlighted how the evolving 
internet technology has been shaped by economic structure. Most notably, and 
despite major technological changes, the institutional environment that consti-
tuted the old mass media system has remained intact.17 Due to the ‘privatiza-
tion’ of important web-infrastructure during the 1990s, corporations became 
the major driving forces of the internet.18 Furthermore, most internet transac-
tions and applications became regulated via markets that have developed in a 
highly oligopolistic fashion - a well-known phenomenon in the media indus-
tries. Online market concentration was facilitated by network effects because, 
unlike in traditional media markets, the value of an online application increases 
relative to the amount of its users.19 Furthermore, companies created artificial 
market entry barriers through conglomeration, the setting and patenting of 
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technological standards as well as copyright legislation.20 Corporate-market 
control has locked the internet by way of monopoly. Wu summarised the state 
of the developments as follows: ‘There is strong reason to believe that there is 
nothing new under the sun, that the great universal network is as disposed to 
monopoly as its predecessors.’21
The underbelly of corporate online concentration constitutes advertising, 
which has effectively honeycombed the internet. Major online markets for 
social media, search engines, internet access and e-commerce are underwrit-
ten by targeted advertising based on surveillance. Since the ‘privatization’ of 
the internet, the advertising industry has shaped media policy enabling the 
use of cookies and other user tracking technology.22 Today, major online firms 
including Facebook and Google, the leading companies in terms of users and 
revenues, use business models that rest on the exploitation of online user data 
for advertising purposes. Fuchs explained how this system operates with refer-
ence to Facebook:
Surveillance on Facebook is surveillance of prosumers, who dynami-
cally and permanently create and share user-generated content, browse 
profiles and data, interact with others, join, create, and build commu-
nities, and co-create information. The corporate web platform opera-
tors and their third-party advertising clients continuously monitor and 
record personal data and online activities; they store, merge and analyse 
collected data. This allows them to create detailed user profiles and to 
know about the personal interests and online behaviour of the users. 
Facebook sells its prosumers as a commodity to advertising clients. 
Money is exchanged for the access to user data that allows economic 
surveillance of the users.23
In the same fashion, Google, which has a portfolio of services including online 
search, e-mail, maps, video (YouTube) and operating systems (Android), 
amongst others, constitutes ‘a vast network for the collection and mining of 
personal data.’24 It is estimated that 90 per cent of Google’s revenues stem from 
selling online adverts. Moreover, Google accounts for one third of the spending 
of global advertising.25 As Fuchs further commented:
Google generates and stores data about the usage of these services in 
order to enable targeted advertising. It sells these data to the advertising 
clients, who then provide advertisements that are targeted to the activi-
ties, searches, contents and interests of the users of Google services.26
Next to Google and Facebook, a multitude of other companies engage in simi-
lar activities. Turow described these practices as ‘one of history’s most massive 
efforts in stealth marketing.’27 Online advertising, of course, poses serious ques-
tions about the nature and implications of surveillance. Furthermore, these 
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developments demonstrate that the internet is geared towards the interests of 
the corporate and advertising industries. As McChesney observed: ‘In most 
internet areas where profits can be generated, private interests have been able to 
convert beachheads into monopoly fortresses and generate endless profits. […] 
Today, the internet as a social medium and information system is the domain 
of a handful of colossal firms.’28
The issues outlined above directly translate into the applicability of the first 
and second institutional ‘filters’ theorized by PM: the media’s concentration 
in ownership size and audience markets as well as advertising dependency.29 
The performance of novel online applications is, thus, likely biased towards 
the interests that underwrite them. Hence, in 1998, Google founders Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin cautioned against advertising sponsorship: ‘We expect 
that advertising funded search engines will be inherently biased towards the 
advertisers and away from the needs of consumers.’30 Years later, when Google 
had already started to use advertising, some of its competitors had alleged that 
Google’s searches might weight their results for the benefit of its commercial 
offerings thus undermining choice.31 Similarly, at a US Senate hearing in 2011, 
Senator Herb Kohl asked: ‘Is it possible for Google to be both an unbiased search 
engine and at the same time own a vast portfolio of Web-based products and 
services?’32 Much more research is needed to answer questions about how cor-
porate-market power and advertising funding might specifically impact online 
searches, networking, and other novel web-applications. For scholars utilizing 
the PM, this significant research gap, in fact, opens up new areas beyond the 
usually applied studies of news media content. Moreover, this section has so far 
revealed that the online environment is constrained by corporate power in the 
same fashion as theorized by PM.
This is similarly true for the realm of news, which has been the primary 
concern of studies using PM. The internet has not facilitated major changes in 
terms of corporate news media performance. It is well documented that con-
temporary off- and online news media sectors are heavily consolidated and 
commercialized.33 Digital technology allows for the establishment of novel 
online offerings. This technically enables the production and distribution of 
news and could foster diversity in sources and opinions. Yet, at this point in 
time, a myriad of novel information websites and blogs are confined to niche 
spaces on the web - virtually invisible to larger publics.34 In contrast, the tra-
ditional news media brands are still the dominant forces in the online world.35 
Markets for online news are heavily concentrated in terms of audiences. A 
major study by Hindman found that ‘online audience concentration equals or 
exceeds that found in most traditional media.’36
It is true that consumption is becoming more fragmented as people increas-
ingly use social media, mobile applications as well as aggregators based on algo-
rithmic content selection to access news. Yet, these trends have not changed the 
fact that a handful of news brands remain dominant.37 People may access news 
via social media and other applications. However, the news content that users 
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actually consume stems from a small set of news brands. Accordingly, the 2016 
Digital News Report of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism found 
‘that even in the era of social media and atomised media, news organisations 
and traditional news brands still matter enormously’ and ‘most of the content 
consumed still comes from newspaper groups, broadcasters, or digital born 
brands that have invested in original content.’38 While there are some novel, 
so-called online-only news organisations such as the Huffington Post or Buzz-
Feed, research suggests that the top news brands in terms of audiences are large 
corporations. For instance, a report by the Media Reform Coalition found that 
in the UK, five companies accounted for 80 per cent of newspaper consump-
tion including online, mobile readers and offline. In terms of local news, the 
report found that six giant conglomerates shared 80 per cent of all outlets while 
more than 50 other publishers allotted the remaining 20 per cent of titles. Simi-
larly, the broadcasting sector in the UK was heavily consolidated with big US 
companies like Rupert Murdoch’s 21st Century Fox empire, Liberty Global and 
Viacom International encroaching the market.39 The authors of the report for 
the Media Reform Coalition drew the following conclusion:
We believe that concentration within news and information markets in 
particular has reached endemic levels in the UK and that we urgently 
need effective remedies. This kind of concentration creates conditions 
in which wealthy individuals and organisations can amass huge politi-
cal and economic power and distort the media landscape to suit their 
interests and personal views. Urgent reform is needed in order both to 
address high levels of concentration in particular media markets and to 
protect against further concentration in others.40
The current state of the media system thus suggests applicability of the analyti-
cal categories of the PM, which place importance on how corporate control and 
consolidation as well as market pressures determine news choices. As Herman 
explained, the PM’s
crucial structural factors derive from the fact that the dominant media 
are firmly embedded in the market system. They are profit-seeking busi-
nesses, owned by very wealthy people (or other companies); and they 
are funded largely by advertisers who are also profit-seeking entities, 
and who want their advertisements to appear in a supportive selling 
environment.41
Hence, as Herman further pointed out, these structural factors should be seen 
as ‘the only possible root of the systematic patterns of media behaviour and 
performance.’42
Given the preceding outline of validity of the PM’s structural foundations, the 
following section explores the continued relevance of ideology and discusses 
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issues that are important in terms of resultant news media content bias. The 
chapter concludes by briefly outlining potential topics for further study.
14.3 Ideological Domination: Humanitarianism, Atrocities 
Management and Elite Utility of Suffering
Much scholarship applying the PM has focused on how military adventures, 
wars, and foreign policy issues have been reported in the news. Ideology has 
been an important concept in this research area: firstly, ideology has been used 
to explain why certain events and issues are able to permeate news filtering 
processes as opposed to others – as outlined by the fifth ‘filter’ of PM. Secondly, 
PM researchers have argued that media content patterns tend to be aligned 
with specific elite interests. As a result, corporate media content is regarded 
as necessarily ideological. Of course, both issues are connected: ideological 
assumptions can pass through the news gates if they are congruent with domi-
nant ideology (the fifth ‘filter’) and consequently manifest as ideological media 
content. The section below thus further explores the continued relevance of as 
well as crucial shifts in contemporary ideology.
Traditionally, scholars have been concerned with how ‘anti-communism’ has 
served as an important ideological tool to legitimize policies in favour of state-
corporate elites.43 For example, ‘anti-communism,’ also coined as the ideology 
of the ‘Cold War’ or the ‘Soviet threat,’ was used as a reference point to justify 
US military interventions after World War II.44 Since the end of the Cold War 
in 1991, ‘anti-Soviet’ ideology has become less important as a schema to legiti-
mise foreign policy adventures.45 According to Shalom: ‘With the collapse of 
the Soviet threat, US officials have had to work overtime to concoct new alibis 
to disguise US foreign policy.’46
Research has established that governments have employed a range of devices 
to explain, justify, and rationalise overt and/or covert military interventions in 
the affairs of sovereign states.47 Hence, old and new ideological narratives used 
to justify interventionist foreign policy agendas have been elaborated in the 
circles of state-corporate power. They include ideologies such as ‘free-market 
democracy,’ the ‘war on terror,’ the ‘war on drugs,’ ‘basic Western benevolence,’ 
and ‘humanitarianism.’48
In terms of military intervention, ‘humanitarianism,’ applied as a highly 
selective interventionist ideology to shame countries unwilling to integrate into 
the ‘Washington Consensus,’ has obtained particular prominence since 1991.49 
‘Humanitarianism’ played a major role in policy and news media discussions 
about potential or actual intervention in Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), 
Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Darfur (2003–2017), Libya (2011), and Syria 
(2012–2018).50 ‘Humanitarianism’ was also evoked, in conjunction with other 
ideological devices, to legitimise the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 
2003 Iraq War.51 It should be noted that ‘humanitarianism’ as an ideology can 
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transport valid reasoning about human rights violations and how they should 
be addressed to alleviate human suffering. On the other hand, PM scholars 
have been concerned with how ‘humanitarianism’ has been instrumentalized 
to serve a narrow militarist agenda whose ultimate goal is not to stop human 
rights violations but to impose Western designs on other nations. Some exam-
ples of this will be further explored below.
An under-researched sub-set of ‘humanitarianism’ constitutes what this 
author defines as atrocity-shaming. In his early work on propaganda during 
World War I, Lasswell found that one goal of propaganda was ‘to mobilise 
hatred against the enemy.’52 According to Lasswell, this involved representing 
an oppositional country ‘as a menacing, murderous aggressor.’53 Such propa-
ganda depicted the enemy in contrast to the noble aims of the home state and 
was used to legitimize the war effort to the public in the home country.54
Atrocity-shaming had also been the topic of early work by Chomsky and Her-
man who looked at how human rights violations conducted by so-called ‘enemy’ 
states of the West were designated to the status of nefarious bloodbaths.55 Nefari-
ous bloodbaths were highlighted in Western policy and human rights circles and 
consequently received significant news media attention. During the process of 
atrocity-shaming, designated perpetrator countries faced serious repercussions 
like criminal proceedings, sanctions, and regime-change interventions.56 Accord-
ing to Chomsky and Herman, nefarious bloodbaths served ‘an extremely impor-
tant public relations function in mobilizing support for US military intervention.’57 
Chomsky and Herman’s research demonstrates how countries have been shamed 
selectively if this served Western strategic interests. So-called ‘allied’ states of the 
West have largely remained exempt from public campaigns of shaming even if 
they conducted similar or greater human rights violations than ‘enemy’ states.58
Moreover, shaming has led to intervention even in cases when evidence for 
atrocities was hardly conclusive and the identity of perpetrators far from clear. 
For instance, NATO used the so-called 1999 Račak massacre in Kosovo as a 
pretext for intervention in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, although facts 
suggested that the dead could have been killed in battle.59 In fact, during the 
Yugoslav Wars, fought roughly between 1991–1999, selective atrocity-shaming 
took place in a range of theatres. Studies suggest that the Western news media, 
policy and human rights systems have mainly focused on Serbian villainy when 
assessing these conflicts.60 Thus, atrocities conducted by the Serbs against Bos-
nians, like the Srebrenica massacre, have received significant media attention 
and were framed as genocide.61 On the other hand, the major news media have 
failed to interrogate the preceding violence in the Srebrenica vicinity, con-
ducted by Bosnian paramilitary forces against the Serbs.62 Similarly, what argu-
ably constituted one of the largest ethnic cleansings during the Yugoslav Wars, 
the purge of the Serbs of the Krajina (in the Republic of Croatia), has largely 
been ignored in the West.63 In these latter cases of violence against the Serbs, 
the genocide label has not been applied in the West. This dichotomised framing 
of victims of violence has served Western policy objectives of establishing frag-
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mented and estranged client states in the Balkans. In contrast, a more objective 
treatment of atrocities committed by all sides in the conflict could arguably 
have better contributed towards conflict resolution and reconciliation.64
Atrocity-shaming as an ideology to demonise an opponent has achieved its peak 
performance during the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The alleged 2011 
Benghazi crackdown on protestors in Libya was used as a justification for NATO 
intervention against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi on the basis of the Responsi-
bility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. It turned out, however, that the Benghazi ‘massacre’ 
was manufactured.65 Careful analysis of the documentary record demonstrates that 
Gaddafi’s forces had not used force indiscriminately against protestors.66
Similarly, in the present war in Syria, atrocities have been instrumentalised to 
justify proxy- and big power intervention.67 In the Syrian theatre, a range of atroc-
ities has been linked to the Syrian government and its forces. In many of these 
cases, however, responsibility for crimes could hardly be established because 
independent verification has not been possible. Furthermore, evidence suggested 
that the Syrian ‘opposition’ aimed at inciting foreign intervention by way of man-
ufacturing bloodbaths.68 Yet, contested atrocities like the Houla, Ghouta, or Khan 
Sheikhoun incidents have been used to justify regime-change agendas in Syria.69
The violence of preceding wars such as in Yugoslavia was evoked as an exam-
ple to call for preventive ‘humanitarian’ interventions. But how likely is it that 
Western military force is going to mitigate violence? In both Libya and Syria, 
Western intervention has had significant repercussions: Kuperman estimated 
that, ‘NATO intervention magnified the death toll in Libya by about seven to 
ten times.’70 Moreover, Libyan society fragmented along sectarian lines. At the 
same time, public health and security collapsed, sending bursts of refugees 
towards Europe.71 In Syria, proxy-intervention sparked high-intensity conflict 
and prolonged a deadly stalemate between the Syrian Army and ‘opposition’ 
forces.72 Additionally, violent conflict fostered the disintegration of the Syrian 
nation state. Taken together, intervention in Libya and Syria destabilised the 
Middle East and fostered the rise of ISIS as well as the massive refugee crisis of 
2014/2015.73 As a PM would predict, these violent repercussions have largely 
been ignored by the news media in terms of relegating Western responsibility. 
Yet, the Balkanisation of the Middle East was well in line with US- and EU  policy 
interests of establishing a set of weak and obedient vassal states. ‘Humanitarian’ 
ideology was crucial in facilitating these outcomes.74
14.4 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the continued relevance of PM in terms of three of its 
news ‘filters’: corporate-market power, advertising dependency, and ideology. 
Moreover, the chapter further provides indicative evidence that major conflicts 
since the end of the Cold War have been reported in the same dichotomous 
fashion that a PM would predict. Significantly, ‘humanitarianism’ has been 
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applied as an ideological device during highly selective campaigns of sham-
ing that led to military intervention. This suggests a shift from Cold War to 
‘humanitarian’ ideology. Of course, the presented examples only constitute a 
first approximation and much more research is needed to solidify the extent to 
which the PM remains relevant in the internet era. The following list provides 
some of the research areas that may be utilized for further study:
1. Assessing the impact of corporate-market constraints and advertising 
funding on the performance of online applications such as online search, 
networking, news, blogging, etc…
2. Providing a comprehensive empirical overview of PM’s ‘filters’ in relation 
to traditional as well as online news sectors.
3. Investigating potential changes and refinements to PM’s ‘filters’ under 
consideration of increased political and interest-group pressure levelled 
against the free flow of information (e.g. suppression of whistle blowers, 
campaign against Wikileaks, etc.).
4. Investigating the vast PR and propaganda industries that currently use the 
internet to disseminate targeted ‘information.’
5. Studying off- and online reporting of high- and low-intensity conflicts 
such as in Libya, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Ukraine or Bahrain, the refugee 
crisis, as well as domestic political, economic and social issues in consid-
eration of PM’s predictions.
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